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In late May and early June 2019, the contract for Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made mis-
sile launchers which make up the S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile system entered the 
final stage of its implementation. This has been confirmed by unequivocal statements from 
the Turkish leadership, the fact that the first group of servicemen (system operators) have 
undergone training in Russia, and the announced arrival in Turkey of the Russian technical 
personnel responsible for the system’s assembly. The first S-400 launchers are likely to be dis-
patched to Turkey as early as July (around six months sooner than the planned supply date). 
At the same time the US, which has blocked Turkey’s attempts to purchase anti-aircraft missile 
systems from Russia and China for years, is stepping up its pressure on Turkey; for example, it 
has announced that the unprecedented sanctions package prepared last year will be imposed 
if the Russian-Turkish deal is finalised.
The crisis around the S-400 is a manifestation of the deep crisis in Turkish-American rela-
tions that has been mounting for several years. More broadly speaking, it is an element of 
the crisis in the relationship between Turkey and the West, and de facto amounts to a major 
aggravation of the situation. The absence of will to make concessions on both sides makes 
any compromise between Ankara and Washington unlikely. At stake are the cohesion of NATO, 
the present and future nature of the US’s leading role, and Turkey’s place in its relations with 
the West and Russia. To some degree, all this affects the position of Russia, which itself is 
interested in undermining the positions of NATO and the US. 
The modernisation of Turkey’s air defence 
Since the 1970s, the ground component of Tur-
key’s air defence has been the American-made 
long-range MIM-14 Nike-Hercules missile 
launchers manufactured a decade earlier. Since 
the 1990s the Turkish military has constant-
ly raised the need to replace them with new- 
-generation armaments, but for many years 
the only option under consideration was the 
American-made MIM-104 Patriot missile sys-
tems, which were treated as the technological 
base for the development of Turkey’s armament 
programmes. The lack of progress in this mat-
ter resulted in the announcement in 2009 of an 
open tender for anti-aircraft missile systems, 
in which the main parameters included price, 
punctuality of supply and access to technology. 
The bidders that took part in the tender includ-
ed American (Raytheon and Lockheed Martin), 
Chinese (CPMIEC), Russian (Rosoboroneksport) 
and European companies (Eurosam), with the 
Chinese finally winning the tender in 2013. 
It is worth noting that the only document signed 
was a preliminary agreement, which the Turkish 
side saw as an element of pressure on Washing-
ton. Under pressure from the US, the contract 
with China was suspended and then cancelled 
The S-400 for Turkey 
The crisis in Turkish-American relations escalates
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 305 2
(2015), and NATO’s Patriot launchers were tem-
porarily relocated to Turkey (2012); this was di-
rectly related to the escalation of the war in Syr-
ia and the involvement of NATO states’ forces 
in this conflict. However, Turkey’s attempts to 
finalise the purchase of the Patriot systems on 
conditions favourable to it failed. These condi-
tions included access to the most recent version 
of the system, access to technology, as well as 
a price Ankara would consider reasonable.
The absence of progress in negotiations with 
Washington, the deterioration of Turkish-Amer-
ican relations (caused, among other factors, 
by the US backing the Syrian Kurds and the 
Turkish opposition), as well as Turkey’s clos-
er cooperation with Russia over Syria, all gave 
an impetus to reviving the idea of purchasing 
the Russian-made S-400 systems to serve as 
a transitory project (and as an instrument of 
pressure in negotiations) in the process of ob-
taining the Patriot systems. The agreement to 
purchase the S-400 was concluded on 28 April 
2017, and the contract was signed on 12 Sep-
tember that year. Russia committed itself to de-
liver four S-400 batteries to Turkey by the end 
of the first quarter of 2020. The contract’s esti-
mated value is US$2.5 billion. The total number 
of missile launchers covered by the contract has 
not been made public, although it should be 
assumed that the number will be 16 (the ba-
sic variant based on the Russian model) or 24 
(the maximum variant used by the militaries of 
NATO states)1.
1 An anti-aircraft battery is composed of 4 to 6 launch-
ers (in the case of the S-400, each contains 4 missiles), 
a radio-location station, a guidance station, a command 
vehicle, and support and protection vehicles.
From the beginning, Moscow has viewed the 
contracts to supply the S-400s to Turkey as 
a matter of prestige. Until February 2019, work 
had progressed according to the adopted 
schedule with no problems arising (unlike in the 
case of the contract to supply S-400s to China), 
and in spring 2018 it even accelerated. Back in 
March 2019, Hulusi Akar, Turkey’s defence min-
ister, announced that the supplies would com-
mence in October (as initially planned); how-
ever, a month later both sides suggested that 
the contract’s implementation would acceler-
ate, and the supplies would commence in July. 
According to announcements made in May 
2019 by Ismail Demir, the head of Turkey’s 
Defence Industries holding,  the supplies are 
likely to commence as early as June. However, 
at the beginning of June Sergey Chemezov, the 
head of the Russian company Rosoboronek-
sport, which is responsible for the contract’s 
implementation, said that the supplies will be-
gin “in two months”2. The decision to launch 
the supplies may be taken at literally any mo-
ment. The launchers that will form elements of 
the first S-400 battery to be delivered to Turkey 
are ready for dispatch, the military personnel 
who will serve as system operators have under-
gone training (they travelled to Russia in late 
May for this purpose), and a date has been set 
for the technical personnel (representatives of 
either the manufacturer or the Almaz-Antey Air 
and Space Defence Corporation) to arrive in Tur-
key in late June to supervise the final stage of 
assembly and configuration of the armaments 
and battery equipment. According to the new 
schedule, all the S-400 systems ordered by Tur-
key are expected to be delivered before the end 
of 2019.
Although the Turkish leadership have ruled out 
the possibility of the contract being cancelled, 
they are conscious of the pressure from the US 
and NATO, and for many months have carried 
2 ‘РФ начнет поставки С-400 Турции через два месяца, 
системы уже произведены – Чемезов’, Интерфакс, 
7 June 2019.
For many years the only option for Turkey 
has been to purchase American Patriots 
as part of the modernisation and develop-
ment of its air defence system.
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out an information campaign to assure the pub-
lic that the contract’s implementation is not at 
risk. Ankara has announced its readiness to su-
pervise the launchers jointly with its allies, and 
is ready to guarantee that no Russian personnel 
will be allowed to operate the S-400s delivered 
to Turkey. Alongside this, it continues to be inter-
ested in purchasing American-made Patriot sys-
tems in the future. These moves have not been 
well received by Washington; according to the 
Turkish side, the Americans have not expressed 
any interest in the proposed appointment of 
a bilateral or broader (NATO-wide) team to dis-
pel the doubts the allies have expressed.
Turkey’s political situation
Both the purchase of the S-400s and Turkey’s 
relations with the US and Russia are elements of 
a more comprehensive background determin-
ing the changes that have been taking place in 
Turkey’s foreign and domestic politics. In this 
context, the first and fundamental process 
is the thorough internal overhaul of the state 
which has been carried out since 2002 by the 
AKP and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, com-
bined with intensive modernisation and a desire 
to play the main role both in Turkey’s immediate 
neighbourhood and on the wider internation-
al scene. To these ends, the country’s political 
priorities include boosting its military potential 
and the intensive development of its high-tech-
nology economy, and the modern S-400 anti- 
-aircraft missile system is one example of this. 
Another is Turkey’s involvement in the Ameri-
can-led project to develop the F-35 multi-role 
combat aircraft (see below). Ankara’s tough 
stance results from the frustration of Turkish 
politicians and Turkish society over the second-
ary role the country is playing in the relations 
with its strategic (Western) allies (in this case 
the US), but also in its relations within NATO and 
with the EU. From the Turkish perspective, the 
US has been ignoring Turkey’s modernisation 
ambitions, Turkish interests in the Middle East 
(the fact that Washington did not consult with 
Ankara on issues such as its invasion of Iraq, 
its policy towards the Arab Spring, the Israeli- 
-Palestinian conflict, Iran etc.), the Cyprus issue; 
finally, the US has been carrying out actions 
that stand in sharp contrast to Turkey’s inter-
ests. Examples of the latter include Washing-
ton’s consistent support for the Syrian Kurds 
(who in Ankara’s opinion represent the Syrian 
wing of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party), 
and for the Gülen movement, which Ankara ac-
cuses of having organised the failed coup d’état 
in 2016 (Gülen resides in the US; Washington 
has not only ruled out his extradition but has 
also continued to actively criticise Turkey’s do-
mestic situation).
Turkey’s sense of being exposed to Washing-
ton’s destabilising actions is one particularly 
sensitive element of Turkish-American rela-
tions. This was hinted at during the mass pro-
tests around Gezi Park (2013), and was more 
openly suggested during the failed coup of 
2016, as well as in the context of Turkey’s im-
prisonment of American pastor Andrew Brun-
son, who was accused of having contact with 
the coup’s perpetrators (in August 2018 the 
US and others imposed sanctions on Turkey in 
response). Turkey is aware of the US’s objec-
tive ability to destabilise its capital markets, as 
manifested in August 2018 in connection with 
the Brunson issue; this is of particular impor-
tance in the context of Turkey’s present eco-
nomic recession and its tense political situa-
tion (the ruling AKP’s relative failure in local 
elections in March 2019, and the controversial 
decision to re-run the election in Istanbul on 
23 June 2019). Another factor weakening Tur-
From Turkey’s perspective, the US has 
been ignoring Turkey’s modernisation 
ambitions, and has taken actions which 
conflict sharply with Turkish interests.
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key’s ties with the West involves the conse-
quences of the large-scale purges carried out 
in the Turkish military following the 2016 coup 
attempt. These mainly affected officers who 
had been in contact with partners from NATO 
armies for many years, and so the purge has 
considerably undermined both confidence in 
the Turkish army and the informal channels of 
communication. 
The tension in Turkish-American relations has 
been accompanied by a thorough revision of 
Turkish-Russian ties. Since the outbreak of the 
civil war in Syria, these relations have teetered 
on the brink of open armed conflict (for exam-
ple due to the downing of the Russian Su-24 jet 
in November 2015), in which Turkey (which sees 
itself as having been abandoned by its allies) 
shifted its position to become Russia’s partner 
in Syria (the two states cooperated in northern 
Syria), deepened its strategic economic coop-
eration (for example by signing a contract to 
construct the second (after Blue Stream, com-
missioned in 2005) gas pipeline, TurkStream, 
in 2016) and strategic military cooperation 
(the contract to purchase the S-400 signed in 
2017). On the one hand, Turkey’s cooperation 
with Russia involves isolated tactical initiatives, 
is burdened with multiple-level tensions and is 
only temporary in nature (especially as regards 
Syria). Moreover, it is beyond doubt that this 
cooperation may be viewed as a bargaining 
chip in Turkey’s relations with the US. On the 
other hand, it is developing at the same pace as 
Turkey’s relations with the West are deteriorat-
ing, accompanied by increasing anti-American 
sentiments and a revival of Turkish nationalism 
(which very well matches the Eurasian ideas pro-
moted by Russia), and finally by major tension 
in relations between Russia and the US (for ex-
ample over the conflict in Ukraine, and Russia’s 
involvement in the US presidential elections in 
2016). In this context, Ankara’s rapprochement 
with Moscow is being viewed (both in Turkey 
and elsewhere) as a strategic alternative to its 
former pro-Western orientation. 
Washington’s hard-line stance
The United States has expressed a clearly neg-
ative opinion on Turkey’s purchase of Rus-
sian-made anti-aircraft defence systems (as well 
as another system manufactured by a non-NATO 
state, as evidenced by the developments sur-
rounding the tender won by the Chinese com-
pany CPMIEC). This stance is convergent with 
Washington’s overall assessment of Turkey.
Its formal basis is the sharp objection to Tur-
key purchasing equipment that is not com-
patible with NATO systems, as well as the fear 
that by retaining at least partial control of 
the launchers delivered to Turkey, Russia may 
be able to read information provided by the 
most advanced American-made jets delivered 
to Turkey, learn the details of their design and 
construction, and then devise effective tactics 
to combat them. The US has also voiced sharp 
criticism as regards the prospect for coopera-
tion between Turkish companies and Russian 
suppliers which have been covered by sanc-
tions imposed on Russia in connection with the 
war in Ukraine. The upcoming implementation 
of the contract to purchase the S-400s has sig-
nificantly boosted the US’s campaign target-
ing this project. This campaign’s elements are 
as follows: 
- threatening to use the Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; 
2017) against Turkey, to impose sanctions on 
companies that cooperate with Russian intel-
ligence services and the armaments sector 
(Section 231); 
From Washington’s perspective, Turkey 
has been consistently and irreversibly 
dismantling the American political system 
in the region, which Russia has been tak-
ing advantage of.
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- suspending the transfer of the F-35 combat 
jets purchased by Turkey (the transfer of F-35 
jets was de facto suspended in August 2018; 
the decision connected with the S-400s was 
confirmed in April 2019), political declarations 
and legislative measures intended to exclude 
Turkey from the project involving the con-
struction of F-35s (Turkey has been involved 
in this project since 2004, and has invested 
around US$1.25 billion in the production of 
100 jets, 30 of which have already been or-
dered; elements of the jets’ fuselage, under-
carriage and cockpit equipment are manufac-
tured in Turkey);
- threatening to suspend cooperation, technol-
ogy transfer and the supply of spare parts for 
the Turkish military and its armaments indus-
try, which would be targeted at Turkish com-
panies involved in production and the Turk-
ish military’s planning process regarding the 
purchase of CH-47F Chinook and UH-60 Black 
Hawk helicopters, F-16 jets, and finally the 
Turkish T129 Atak helicopter, which is built 
with the use of American-made components 
and technology, and is exported to Pakistan 
and other countries. Regardless of the prob-
lems American companies would face (the 
need to transfer production activities outside 
Turkey), the costs of these actions for Ankara 
are estimated at US$10 billion.
Alongside the planned activities directly con-
nected with the S-400, in recent weeks the US 
Congress has resumed work on drawing up 
sanctions to be imposed on Turkey (Turkish offi-
cials and politicians) in connection with the fear 
that the civil rights of Americans in Turkey may 
be threatened (this is a reference to the sanc-
tions imposed in 2018 in connection with pas-
tor Brunson’s imprisonment). The Department 
of State, for its part, has withdrawn its con-
ditional consent to Turkey importing oil from 
Iran, and has offered sharp criticism of Turkey’s 
attempts to explore natural gas fields on the 
Cyprus Shelf. The pressure was to be crowned 
by an informal ultimatum from the Department 
of State setting the date for Turkey’s withdraw-
al from its planned acquisition of the S-400s 
for 9 June 2019. Two days before this deadline, 
citing Patrick Shanahan, the acting US Secretary 
of Defence, American media reported that the 
Pentagon had communicated an ultimatum to 
Turkey according to which the deadline for ex-
cluding Turkey from the F-35 programme was 
set for 31 July. If Ankara ultimately does not 
formally abandon its purchase of the S-400s, 
after this date the training of Turkish service-
men currently residing in the US will be can-
celled (it has already been suspended). The first 
group of officers included 42 individuals; the 
US has refused to accept another group com-
posed of 34 pilots and ground service special-
ists who were expected to arrive in the US to 
take part in training in the second half of 2019. 
The participation of Turkish companies in the 
F-35 programme is to end by 2020.
The above-listed activities, alongside media 
reports regarding Turkey’s current economic 
problems (including a recession, the absence of 
reserves and its dependence on foreign loans), 
should be viewed as an element for putting 
pressure on Turkey, in order to make it sensitive 
to American economic pressure and undermine 
its credibility in the eyes of investors and lend-
ers. Against the backdrop of American pressure, 
suggestions to resolve the dispute by achiev-
ing a relative compromise were almost silent: 
an offer to sell the latest version of the Patriot 
system at a slightly more attractive price, com-
bined with a gradual redeployment of NATO 
batteries, was reiterated in February 2019.
The determination with which the US is putting 
pressure on Turkey seems surprising in the con-
In this deep crisis in Turkish-American re-
lations, Moscow has been effectively lead-
ing Ankara to think that it can present an 
alternative and a counterbalance to the US.
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text of the doubts that have emerged regarding 
some of the formal reservations concerning the 
S-400 systems purchased by Ankara. The main 
doubt relates to the fact that the F-35s used by 
Israel and Norway are at present being tracked 
by Russian radars which are elements of the 
S-400 systems located in Syria and Murmansk 
oblast respectively. Another doubt – in the light 
of available information – is the fact that Russia 
usually transfers full control of the system to 
the purchaser (in the case of American-made 
launchers, the manufacturer retains some de-
gree of control over them). Due to the nature 
of the transaction (Russia does not sell systems 
which are identical to those its own armed forc-
es use), it cannot be ruled out that – driven by 
political and strategic motives (disrupting NA-
TO’s coherence) rather than military and techni-
cal motives (expanding the field of surveillance 
over a potential enemy) – Moscow is indeed 
ready to give Ankara full control of the launch-
ers it sells to Turkey3. It is beyond doubt that 
one important motivation for Washington’s de-
termination is the US’s rivalry with Russia on the 
market for high-technology armaments: in this 
case, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s boosts 
the system’s prestige and increases its market 
attractiveness (in October 2018 India signed 
a contract to purchase S-400s, although it had 
previously been interested in buying Patriots; 
at present Washington is making threats of 
sanction to the government in Delhi as well). 
3 It is unlikely that the Turkish army would approve an ar-
mament for operation which had not been tested for the 
presence of spying devices used by a third party (which 
does not rule out the possibility that Russia might have 
attempted to install such systems in the S-400). One of 
the most important factors for Turkey, when it consid-
ered the purchase of Patriots, was that it should have 
full autonomy in using them. In the case of the purchase 
of the S-400s, it is more likely that Russia agreed to im-
plement the contract on conditions favourable to Turkey 
(both in the military-technical and the financial aspect) 
because it viewed this as primarily a politically-motivat-
ed undertaking that would weaken of the relations be-
tween NATO’s two biggest armies and deepen the cur-
rent divides within NATO. It is worth noting that Russia 
has other means of radio-location and radio-electronic 
reconnaissance in the Black Sea basin and in the east-
ern part of the Mediterranean Sea basin (including the 
S-400 units deployed in Syria).
For the US, from the military point of view, the 
fact that its ally Turkey has purchased a techno-
logically advanced armament system over which 
the US army will have no control may be a prob-
lem, especially as both states’ military involve-
ment in the Middle East is increasingly divergent 
(it is Turkey, rather than Russia, that may use 
the S-400s to spy on the Americans).
The US’s stance is easier to understand in the 
context of the accusations which the American 
leadership has been levelling against Turkey for 
years. Since at least 2003, Washington has ex-
pressed its irritation at Ankara torpedoing the 
US’s Middle Eastern policy. This included Tur-
key’s objection to the US-led intervention in 
Iraq; its periodically blocking the activity of the 
US base in İncirlik; its fight against the Kurds 
(who are the US’s main client in Syria); its con-
frontational approach to Israel, Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt; its cooperation with radical Muslim 
organisations; its (limited) cooperation with 
Iran, etc. Turkey’s domestic policies have also 
triggered serious disquiet in Washington and 
among the American public. These policies in-
clude violations of civil rights (especially in re-
lation to US citizens, Turkish military officials, 
journalists, Kurds, and individuals accused of 
being linked to Fethullah Gülen). Other issues 
include Turkey’s closer cooperation with Russia 
in order to challenge American interests in Syr-
ia; to undermining the US’s moves to tighten its 
policy towards Russia over Moscow’s aggres-
sion against Ukraine; and to counter the an-
ti-Russian mood in the Congress and the media 
which have been reinforced by the accusations 
that Russia meddled in the US presidential cam-
paign in 2016. From Washington’s perspective, 
Turkey is disassembling the American political 
The dispute over the S-400 may result 
in Turkey’s withdrawal from its commit-
ments to NATO, at least in matters related 
to Russia.
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system in the region, while itself becoming the 
subject of Russia’s game. According to Wash-
ington, Ankara is doing so in a conscious, con-
sistent manner which will prove irreversible in 
the current political landscape. The S-400 issue 
seems to be not so much the cause of the crisis 
as a catalyst for a new stage of it.
Russia’s game
Russia is playing a game focused on Turkey’s am-
bitions and on the deep crisis in Turkish-Ameri-
can relations in an exceptionally skilful manner. 
At the same time, it is stoking the tension and 
effectively building a conviction in Ankara that 
Russia is the alternative and counterbalance 
to the US. Alongside this, Moscow is trying to 
maintain an appearance of altruism and an at 
least tactical complementarity of the policies 
pursued by the two states, especially against 
the backdrop of differences between Turkey 
and the West. Russia’s attractiveness for Ankara 
was demonstrated during the two states’ coop-
eration in Syria (regardless of the actual block-
ade of Turkey’s expansion in the region and its 
constant reduction of the influence built up by 
Turkey), in Russia’s support for Turkey’s domes-
tic policy (for example, in the context of West-
ern criticism regarding the purges carried out 
following the attempted coup in Turkey), and in 
the prospect of economic benefits (such as the 
cooperation in the gas sector that has brought 
financial benefits to the new ruling elites in 
Turkey). The contract for the sale of the S-400s 
to Turkey – which Russia is implementing on 
favourable financial terms and according to 
a highly preferential schedule – is an excellent 
example of this trend. Another example is Rus-
sia’s suggestion (voiced in tandem with Wash-
ington’s subsequent threats) regarding Turkey’s 
participation in the development of the design, 
production and its subsequent purchase of the 
Russian fifth-generation Su-57 multi-role com-
bat aircraft and the latest S-500 air defence 
missile systems (in May 2019 President Erdoğan 
announced Turkey’s intention to take part in 
the project). Ankara increasingly views its coop-
eration with Russia as an opportunity to solve 
its current problems, and treats Russia as a re-
liable supplier of anti-aircraft defence systems, 
should the contract for the S-400s be imple-
mented. However, at the same time, this coop-
eration considerably reduces Turkey’s strategic 
importance; a mere four launcher batteries will 
not meet Turkey’s needs, and pose a risk that 
Turkey’s defence cooperation with the US may 
be cancelled (Turkey continues to hope that in 
the end it will purchase the Patriots). Moreo-
ver, Turkey’s contract with Russia risks addition-
al financial problems for Turkey (the threat of 
a freeze on current investments in cooperation 
with the US). Another important problem is the 
risk of financial problems for Turkish companies 
from the armaments sector, should sanctions 
be imposed; also, the risks connected with the 
overall economic slowdown in Turkey may in-
crease. As for Russia, regardless of its tempo-
rary profit from the sale and promotion of the 
S-400s, with its actions it is coming increasing-
ly closer to achieving its strategic goals, which 
include building influence in Turkey itself, un-
dermining NATO’s coherence (the Turkish army 
is NATO’s second biggest after that of the US) 
and disassembling an American network of alli-
ances, ties and dependencies, in this case in the 
Middle Eastern region.
Prospects 
As the process of Turkey purchasing the S-400 
system is now well-advanced, the interested 
parties have adopted a hard-line stance, and 
considering the pressure from the public and the 
elites in both Turkey and in the US, we should 
expect the contract to be finalised in the coming 
weeks. For Turkey, this would mean a significant 
strengthening of its own military capability, 
which would for example translate directly into 
its activity in Syria targeted at the local Kurds 
(although this would be combined with the risk 
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of heightened tension with the US troops who 
are de facto protecting the Kurds). At the same 
time, the contract’s finalisation would mean 
more opportunities for cooperation with Russia 
in almost any field. However, it is very unlike-
ly that the temporary benefits for Turkey could 
translate into stable trends: for example, due 
to the US’s overall approach, the power of its 
instruments and Turkey’s domestic limitations 
(economic problems on the one hand and its 
asymmetric approach to Russia on the other).
In the context of the US Administration and the 
Congress’s tough stance and determination, 
we should expect the immediate imposition 
of sanctions against Turkey (this is what hap-
pened during former crises, and would be in 
line with current pronouncements), as well as 
a considerable rise in anti-American sentiment 
within Turkey. With regard to possible retaliato-
ry measures, it is very likely that Ankara will try 
to use the limitations on the US using military 
infrastructure in Turkey as an instrument to put 
pressure on it; this will primarily involve the base 
at İncirlik, which is extremely important for the 
US’s actions in the Middle East. Regardless of 
how effective the long-term, US-led sanctions 
against Turkey are, Washington has the tools to 
hit Turkey’s economic credibility and the Turk-
ish lira, a move which may trigger an escalation 
of socio-political tension in Turkey (a more de-
structive variant of the events that happened in 
August 2018). The US has de facto control over 
a range of instruments that could destabilise 
Turkey’s domestic situation, and may be willing 
to use them either consciously or not.
Even if a very unlikely compromise is reached 
(the supplies of the S-400s are suspended and 
control of them is transferred to the NATO 
allies) the potential for further Turkish-American 
tension remains unchanged (Turkey’s domestic 
situation, the Kurds), just as retaliatory measures 
from Russia targeting Ankara are equally likely 
(e.g. the crisis over the Syrian province of Idlib). 
At present, the Turkish issue is the most im-
portant test of the US’s leadership of NATO. 
Combined with the uncompromising Ameri-
can stance, Turkey’s ambitions and frustrations 
(stoked by Russia) affect the relative cohesion of 
NATO both in relation to Russia (which is viewed 
as an enemy to greater or lesser degrees) and in 
the Middle East. Restoring confidence between 
the US & its allies and Turkey would be a lengthy 
and difficult process. It is more likely that Tur-
key will withdraw from its allied commitments 
under NATO, at least in matters relating to Rus-
sia. In the worst-case scenario, the tension will 
escalate: the threat of incidents in the Middle 
East will increase, and most importantly, the 
current situation will trigger a destabilisation of 
Turkey’s domestic situation.
APPENDIX
The S-400 anti-aircraft defence system and its users
The S-400 ‘Triumph’ long-range anti-aircraft missile system is manufactured by the Almaz-Antey 
Air and Space Defence Corporation. According to available information, it enables reconnaissance, 
tracking and destruction of all types of air attack (aircraft and missiles) in conditions of active ra-
dio-electronic warfare and other jamming measures. The S-400 missiles can strike aerodynamic 
targets (aircraft and cruise missiles) at distances of 2–400 km (confirmed successful strike using 
a 40N6E missile at a distance of 380 km) and ballistic missiles (rockets) at distances of 5–60 km, 
which are moving at speeds of up to 4.8 km/s, at heights of 5 m – 35 km. The radio-location and 
guidance stations (of a battalion set or battery) enable concurrent tracking of up to 160 targets and 
shooting of up to 80 targets.
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The Russian Aerospace Forces are the main users of the S-400. The first systems were purchased in 
2007, and the spring of 2019 saw the end of the process of shifting to the S-400s within the State 
Armaments Programme (Russian: GPV), which had been planned to close by 2020. 28 regiments 
(56 battalions) are equipped with S-400s, covering 448 launchers and 1792 missiles in total. 
The Moscow and Kaliningrad oblasts are the regions with the biggest number of this type of arma-
ments. Outside Russia, there are two battalions equipped with S-400s that cover the Russian bases 
in Syria (Khmeimim and Tartus).
China is the first non-Russian user of the S-400s. A contract worth US$3 billion was signed in April 
2015, and the first of four regiment sets was delivered in January–May 2018. Delivery of another 
regiment set is planned for 2019. The implementation of the contract with China has been delayed, 
and is subject to obscure problems concerning the supply of missiles.
India is the third state (after Turkey) to have signed a contract for the delivery of S-400s (in October 
2018). It intends to equip 5 regiments with the system (80 launchers), and the total value of the 
contract is estimated at US$5 billion.
Saudi Arabia announced a preliminary decision to purchase S-400s in 2017, although under pressure 
from the US the negotiations have been suspended.
According to unofficial information, Russia has refused to sell S-400s to Iran. It is possible that this 
announcement was an element of deliberate disinformation on Russia’s part; this seems all the more 
likely because the announcement was made in late May 2019, during the period of the US’s increased 
pressure on Turkey. The same can be said about the announcement by the Iraqi ambassador in Mos-
cow (also made in May 2019) regarding the Baghdad government’s alleged decision to purchase 
the S-400 system.
